The scenario
A self-employed Dutch consultant uses the same password for her client-portal account and her personal email. The password was leaked in a 2019 LinkedIn breach she never heard about. In 2026 an attacker takes the leaked credentials, automatically tries them against 200 SaaS providers, gets a hit on her client portal, downloads three years of invoice templates, and emails her clients new wire instructions for outstanding amounts. €91,000 moves before the third client calls her to check. The password was strong (16 characters). It just wasn't unique. Within four hours she had: enabled phishing-resistant MFA on every account, installed a password manager, and rotated 47 passwords. She wished she'd done it the day before.
How the attack works
Two layers of defence matter: the password itself, and the MFA on top of it. **The password layer.** Most attacks against passwords are not 'guessing your password' — they are reusing passwords from prior breaches. Every dump on Have I Been Pwned (haveibeenpwned.com) is a list of credentials being mass-tested against every SaaS the attackers can think of. The fix is a password manager (Bitwarden, 1Password, etc.) generating a unique strong password per account. Length matters more than complexity — a 16-character random string is fine; 'P@ssw0rd!' is not. **The MFA layer.** MFA adds 'something you have' to 'something you know'. But the four common MFA methods have very different security profiles. **SMS codes**: defeats password-only attacks but is relayable in real time by phishing kits and can be stolen via SIM-swap. Better than nothing, worse than every alternative. **TOTP authenticator apps (Google Authenticator, Authy)**: defeats password-only attacks, defeats SIM-swap, but is relayable in real time by reverse-proxy phishing kits like Evilginx. Still better than SMS. **Push notifications (Microsoft Authenticator, Duo)**: same security as TOTP, but adds MFA-fatigue vulnerability where an attacker spams prompts until you tap approve. **FIDO2 / passkeys**: cryptographically bound to the legitimate URL — the attacker's proxy domain doesn't match, so the protocol fails. This is the only method that defeats all the major 2026 attack patterns including AiTM, MFA fatigue, and SIM-swap. The four attack patterns to defend against: password-only (defeated by any MFA), SIM-swap (defeated by anything except SMS), real-time relay / AiTM (defeated only by FIDO2/passkeys), MFA fatigue (defeated by FIDO2 or by removing push prompts).
What to watch for
- Any account you sign into that doesn't have MFA — enable it immediately, especially email, financial, and identity-provider accounts
- Reused passwords across accounts — a single breach compromises every account sharing that password
- SMS-based MFA on high-value accounts (bank, primary email) — upgrade to TOTP or passkeys
- Unsolicited MFA prompts on your phone — someone has your password and is trying to log in
- MFA-fatigue patterns — multiple push prompts in quick succession
What to do
- Install a password manager today — Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePassXC are good starting pointsGenerate a unique 16+ character password per account. The master password is the only one you need to remember.
- Enable MFA on every account that supports it — start with email and financialYour email is the recovery channel for every other account. Protect it first.
- Upgrade SMS-based MFA to TOTP or passkeys where supportedMicrosoft, Google, Apple all support passkeys in 2026. So do most banks and major SaaS providers.
- If you see an unsolicited MFA prompt: reject it, change your password from a clean device, and reportRejection alone isn't enough — the attacker has your password and will try again.
- Check Have I Been Pwned for every email address you useFree service: haveibeenpwned.com. Rotate any password that appears in a breach.
Defenses to deploy
Technical controls
- Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) enforced via conditional access for all employees
- Password manager rolled out as a managed company tool (Bitwarden Teams, 1Password Business)
- Continuous-access evaluation revoking sessions on risk events
- Sign-in anomaly alerting on the IdP
Policy controls
- Written policy: no reused passwords, no shared passwords, no password-in-email
- Onboarding workflow includes password-manager + MFA enrolment on day one
- Quarterly review of MFA method coverage — drive 100% phishing-resistant adoption
Training cadence
Lesson once. Reinforce with a quarterly 'is your MFA still SMS?' nudge until everyone is on passkeys.
Quick check
Five questions. Answers and rationale appear after submission.
- Q1.
What is the single highest-leverage personal cyber-hygiene change you can make today?
- Q2.
Why is FIDO2 / passkey MFA categorically stronger than TOTP or SMS?
- Q3.
You receive an MFA push prompt at 2 AM. You are not signing in. Correct response?
- Q4.
Is a 16-character random password generated by a password manager 'secure'?
- Q5.
Which MFA method does NOT defend against SIM-swap attacks?
Sources & further reading
- NIST SP 800-63B — Authenticator guidance[primary]
- NCSC-NL — Wachtwoorden en MFA[primary]
- FIDO Alliance — Passkeys[primary]
- Have I Been Pwned[secondary]
- Krebs on Security — SIM-swap and MFA bypass case studies[secondary]